Mancini 24 novembre (consiglio di lettura) by Colombo, Asher Daniel
4
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist
Theory, and Antiracist Politics [1989]
Kimberle Crenshaw
One of the very few Black women’s studies books is entitled All the Women
Are White, All the Blacks Are Men, But Some of Us Are Brave.’ I have chosen
this title as a point of departure in my efforts to develop a Black feminist
criticism because it sets forth a problematic consequence of the tendency to
treat race and gender as mutually exclusive categories of experience and analysis.3
• I want to examine how this tendency is perpetuated by a single-axis
framework that is dominant in antidiscrimination law and that is also reflected
in feminist theory and antiracist politics.
I will center Black women in this analysis In order to contrast the multi
dimenslonality of Black women’s experience with the single-axis analysis that
distorts these experiences. Not only will this juxtaposition reveal how Black
women are theoretically erased, it will also illustrate how this framework imports
its own theoretical limitations that undermine efforts to broaden feminist and
antiracist analyses. With Black women as the starting point, it becomes more
apparent how dominant conceptions of discrimination condition us to think
about subordination as disadvantage occurring along a single categorical axis.
I want to suggest further that this single-axis framework erases Black women
In the conceptualization, identification and remediation of race and sex discrimination by limiting inquiry to the experiences of otherwise-privileged
members of the group. In other words, in race discrimination cases, discrimination
tends to be viewed in terms of sex- or class-privileged Blacks, In sex discrimination
cases, the focus is on race- and class-privileged women.
This focus on the most privileged group members marginalizes those whoare muLtiply-burdened and obscures claims that cannot be understood as resultingfrom discrete sources of discrimination. I suggest further that this focus onotherwise-privileged group members creates a distorted analysis of racism and
sexism because the operative conceptions of race and sex become grounded in
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experiences that actually represent only a subset of a much more complex
phenomenon.
After examining the doctrinal manifestations of this single-axis framework,
I will discuss how it contributes to the marginalization of Black women in
feminist theory and in antiracist politics. I argue that Black women are sometimes
excluded from feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse because both are
predicated on a discrete set of experiences that often does not accurately reflect
the interaction of race and gender. These problems of exclusion cannot be
solved simply by including Black women within an already established analytical
structure. Because the intersectional experience is greater than the sum of
racism and sexism, any analysis that does not take intersectionality into account
cannot sufficiently address the particular manner In which Black women are
subordinated. Thus, for feminist theory and antiracist policy discourse to embrace
the experiences and concerns of Black women, the entire framework that has
been used as a basis for translating “women’s experience” or “the Black
experience” into concrete policy demands must be rethought and recast.
As examples of theoretical and political developments that miss the mark
with respect to Black women because of their failure to consider intersectionality,
I will briefly discuss the feminist critique of rape and separate spheres ideology,
and the public policy debates concerning female-headed households within the
Black community.
I. The Antidiscrimination Framework
A. The Experience of Intersectionality
and the Doctrinal Response
One way to approach the problem of intersectionality is to examine how
courts frame and interpret the stories of Black women plaintiffs. While I cannot
claim to know the circumstances underlying the cases that I will discuss, I
nevertheless believe that the way courts interpret claims made by Black women
is Itself part of Black women’s experience and, consequently, a cursory review
of cases involving Black female plaintiffs is quite revealing. To illustrate the
difficulties inherent in judicial treatment of intersectionality, I will consider
three Title VU4 cases: DeGraffenreid v General Motors,5 Moore v Hughes
Helicoprers6 and Payne v Travenoi7
I. DeGraffenreid v General Motors
In DeGraffenreid, five Black women brought suit against General Motors,
alleging that the employer’s seniority system perpetuated the effects of past
discrimination against Black women. Evidence adduced at trial revealed that
General Motors simply did not hire Black women prior to 1964 and that all
of the Black women hired after 1970 lost their jobs in a seniority-based layoff
during a subsequent recession. The district court granted summary Judgment
for the defendant, rejecting the plaintiffs’ attempt to bring a suit not on behalf
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of Blacks or women, but specifically on behalf of Black women. The court
stated:
iPilaintiffs have failed to cite any decisions which have stated that slack women
are a special class to be protected from discrimination. The Courts own researchhas failed to disclose such a decision. The plaintiffs are clearly entitled to a remedy
if they have been discriminated against. However they should not be allowed to
combine statutory remedies to create a new super-remedy’ which would give
them relief beyond what the drafters of the relevant statutes intended. Thus, this
lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause of action for race discrimination,
sex discrimination, or alternatively either, but not a combination of both.8
Although General Motors did not hire Black women prior to 1964, the
court noted that “General Motors has hired. . female employees for a number
of years prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of j9fi49 Because
General Motors did hire women—albeit white women—during the period that
no Black women were hired, there was, in the court’s view, no sex discrimination
that the seniority system could conceivably have perpetuated.
After refusing to consider the plaintiffs’ sex discrimination claim, the Court
dismissed the race discrimination complaint and recommended its consolidation
with another case alleging race discrimination against the same employer.’0The
plaintiffs responded that such consolidation would defeat the purpose of their
suit since theirs was not purely a race claim, but an action brought specifically
on behalf of Black women alleging race and sex discrimination. The court,
however, reasoned;
The legislative history surrounding Title VII does not indicate that rhe goal of
the statute was to create a new classification of ‘black women’ who would havegreater standing than, for example, a black male. The prospect of the creation ofnew classes of protected minorities, governed only by the mathematical principlesof permutation and combination, clearly raises the prospect of opening thehackneyed Pandora’s box.
Thus, the court apparently concluded that Congress either did not contemplate
that Black women could be discriminated against as “Black women” or did not
intend to protect them when such discrimination occurred.° The court’s refusal
in DeGraffenreid to acknowledge that Black women encounter combined race
and sex discrimination implies that the boundaries of sex and race discrimination
doctrine are defined respectively by white women’s and Black men’s experiences.
Under this view, Black women are protected only to the extent that theirexperiences coincide with those of either of the two groups.’5 Where theirexperiences are distinct, Black women can expect little protection as long asapproaches, such as that in DeGraffenreid, which completely obscure problemsof intersectionallty prevail.
2. Moore v Hughes Helicopters, Inc.
Moore ti Hughes Helicopters, Inc.’4 presents a different way in which courtsfall to understand or recognize Black women’s claims. MooTe Is typical of a
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number of cases in which courts refused to certify Black females as class
represenratives in race and sex discrimination actions.15 In Moore, the plaintiff
alleged that the employer, Hughes Helicopter, practiced race and sex discrirn
ination in promotions to upper-level craft positions and to supervisory jobs.
Moore introduced statistical evidence establishing a significant disparity between
men and women, and somewhat less of a disparity between Black and white
men in supervisory jobs.’6
Affirming the district court’s refusal to certify Moore as the class representative
in the sex discrimination complaint on behalf of all women at Hughes, the
Ninth Circuit noted approvingly:
Moore had never claimed before the EEOC that she was discriminated against
as a female, but only as a Black female. . (Tlhis raised serious doubts as to
Moore’s ability to adequately represent white female employees.’7
The curious logic in Moore reveals not only the narrow scope ofantidiscrimination
doctrine and its failure to embrace intersectionality, but also the centrality of
white female experiences in the conceptualization of gender discrimination.
One inference that could be drawn from the court’s statement that Moore’s
complaint did not entail a claim of discrimination “against females” is that
discrimination against Black females is something less than discrimination against
females. More than likely, however, the court meant to imply that Moore did
not claim that all females were discriminated against but only Black females.
But even thus recast, the court’s rationale is problematic for Black women.
The court rejected Moore’s bid to represent all females apparently because her
attempt to specify her race was seen as being at odds with the standard allegation
that the employer simply discriminated “against females.”
The court failed to see that the absence of a racial referent does not necessarily
mean that the claim being made Is a more inclusive one. A white woman
claiming discrimination against females may be in no better position to represent
all women than a Black woman who claims discrimination as a Black female
and wants to represent all females. The court’s preferred articulation of “against
females” is not necessarily more inclusive—it just appears to be so because the
racial contours of the claim are not specified.
The court’s preference for “against females” rather than “against Black
females” reveals the implicit grounding of white female experiences in the
doctrinal conceptualization of sex discrimination. For white women, claiming
sex discrimination is simply a statement that but for gender, they would not
have been disadvantaged. For them there is no need to specify discrimination
as white females because their race does not contribute to the disadvantage for
which they seek redress. The view of discrimination that is derived from this
grounding takes race privilege as a given.
Discrimination against a white female is thus the standard sex discrimination
claim; claims that diverge from this standard appear to present some sort of
hybrid claim. More significantly, because Black females’ claims are seen as hybrid,
they sometimes cannot represent those who may have “pure” claims of sex
discrimination. The effect of this approach is that even though a challenged
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policy or practice may clearly discriminate against all females, the fact that it
has particularly harsh consequences for Black females places Black female
plaintiffs at odds with white females.
Moore illustrates one of the limitations of antidiscrimination laws remedial
scope and normative vision. The refusal to allow a multiply-disadvantaged class
to represent others who may be singularly-disadvantaged defeats efforts to
restructure the distribution of opportunity and limits remedial relief to minor
adjustments within an established hierarchy. Consequently, “bottom-up ap
proaches, those which combine all discriminatees in order to challenge an
entire employment system, are foreclosed by the limited view of the wrong
and the narrow scope of the available remedy. If such “bottom-up” intersectional
representation were routinely permitted, employees might accept the possibility
that there is more to gain by collectively challenging the hierarchy rather than
by each discriminatee individually seeking to protect her source of privilege
within the hierarchy. But as long as antidiscrimination doctrine proceeds from
the premise that employment systems need only minor adjustments, opportunities
for advancement by disadvantaged employees will be limited. Relatively privileged
employees probably are better off guarding their advantage while jockeying
against others to gain more. As a result, Black women—the class of employees
which, because of its intersectionality, is best able to challenge all forms of
discrimination—are essentially Isolated and often required to fend for themseLves.
In Moore, the court’s denial of the plaintiff’s bid to represent all Blacks and
females left Moore with the task of supporting her race and sex discrimination
claims with statistical evidence of discrimination against Black females alone.
Because she was unable to represent white women or Black men, she could
not use overall statistics on sex disparity at Hughes, nor could she use statistics
on race. Proving her claim using statistics on Black women alone was no small
task, due to the fact that she was bringing the suit under a disparate impact
theory of discrimination.’9
The court further limited the relevant statistical pool to include only Black
women who It determined were qualified to fill the openings in upper-level
labor jobs and in supervisory positions.’° According to the court, Moore hadnot demonstrated that there were any qualified Black women within herbargaining unit or the general labor pool for either category of jobs.SL Finally,the court stated that even if it accepted Moore’s contention that the percentageof Black females in supervisory positions should equal the percentage of Blackfemales in the employee pool, it still would not find discriminatory impacr.ZZBecause the promotion of only two Black women Into supervisory positionswould have achieved the expected mean distribution of Black women withinthat job category, the court was “unwilling to agree that a prima facie case ofdisparate impact ha[dj been proven.”23
The court8 rulings on Moore’s sex and race claim left her with such a smallstatistical sample that even if she had proved that there were qualified Blackwomen, she could not have shown discrimination under a disparate impacttheory. Moore illustrates yet another way that antidiscrimination doctrineessentially erases Black women’s distinct experiences and, as a result, deemstheir discrimination complaints groundless.
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3. PaynevTrovenol
Black female plaintiffs have also encountered difficulty in their efforts to
win certification as class representatives in some race discrimination actions.
This problem typically arises in cases where statistics suggest significant disparities
between Black and white workers and further disparities between Black men
and Black women. Courts in some cases24 have denied certification based on
logic that mirrors the rationale in Moore: The sex disparities between Black
men and Black women created such conflicting interests that Black women
could not possibly represent Black men adequately. In one such case, Payne v
TravenoI,2 two Black female plaintiffs alleging race discrimination brought a
class action Suit on behalf of all Black employees at a pharmaceutical plant.26
The court refused, however, to allow the plaintiffs to represent Black males
and granted the defendant’s request to narrow the class to Black women only.
Ultimately, the district court found that there had been extensive racial
discrimination at the plant and awarded back pay and constructive seniority
to the class of Black female employees. But, despite its finding of general race
discrimination, the court refused to extend the remedy to Black men for fear
that their conflicting interests would not be adequately addressed7 the Fifth
Circuit affirmed,25
Notably, the plaintiffs in Travenol fared better than the similarly-situated
plaintiff in Moore: They were not denied use of meaningful statistics showing
an overall pattern of race discrimination simply because there were no men
in their class. The plaintiffs’ bid to represent all Black employees, however,
like Moore’s attempt to represent all women employees, failed as a consequence
of the court’s narrow view of class interest.
Even though Travenol was a partial victory for Black women, the case
specifically illustrates how antidiscrimination doctrine generally creates a dilemma
for Black women. It forces them to choose between specifically articulating the
intersectional aspects of their subordination, thereby risking their ability to
represent Black men, or ignoring intersectionality in order to state a claim that
would not lead to the exclusion of Black men. When one considers the political
consequences of this dilemma, there is little wonder that many people within
the Black cormounity view the specific articulation of Black women’s interests
as dangerously divisive.
In sum, several courts have proved unable to deal with intersectionality,
although for contrasting reasons. In DeGraffenreid, the court refused to recognize
the possibility of compound discrimination against Black women and analyzed
their claim using the employment of white women as the historical base. As
a consequence, the employment experiences of white women obscured the
distinct discrimination that Black women experienced.
Conversely, in Moore, the court held that a Black woman could not use
statistics reflecting the overall sex disparity in supervisory and upper-level labor
jobs because she had not claimed discrimination as a woman, but “only” as a
Black woman. The court would not entertain the notion that discrimination
experienced by Black women is indeed sex discrimination—provable through
disparate impact statistics on women.
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Finally, courts, such as the one in Travenol, have held that Black women
cannot represent an entire class of Blacks due to presumed class conflicts in
cases where sex additionally disadvantaged Black women. As a result, in the
few cases where Black women are allowed to use overall statistics indicating
racially disparate treatment Black men may not be able to share in the remedy.
Perhaps it appears to some that I have offered inconsistent criticisms of how
Black women are treated in antidiscrirnination law: I seem to be saying that
in one case, Black women’s claims were rejected and their experiences obscured
because the court refused to acknowledge that the employment experience of
Black women can be distinct from that of white women, while in other cases,
the interests of Black women are harmed because Black women’s claims were
viewed as so distinct from the claims of either white women or Black men
that the court denied to Black females representation of the larger class, It
seems that I have to say that Black women are the same and harmed by being
treated differently, or that they are different and harmed by being treated the
same. But I cannot say both.
This apparent contradiction is but another manifestation of the conceptual
limitations of the single-Issue analyses that intersectionality challenges. The
point is that Black women can experience discrimination In any number of
ways and that the contradiction arises from our assumptions that their claims
of exclusion must be unidirectional. Consider an analogy to traffic in an
intersection, coming and going in all four directions. Discrimination, like traffic
through an intersection, may flow in one direction, and it may flow In another.
If an accident happens In an intersection, it can be caused by cars traveling
from any number of directions and, sometimes, from all of them. Similarly, if
a Black woman is harmed because she is In the intersection, her injury could
result from sex discrimination or race discrimination.
Judicial decisions which premise intersectional relief on a showing that Black
women are specifically recognized as a class are analogous to a doctor’s decision
at the scene of an accident to treat an accident victim only if the injury is
recognized by medical insurance. Similarly, providing legal relief only when
Black women show that their claims are based on race or on sex is analogous
to calling an ambulance for the victim only after the driver responsible for
the injuries is Identified. But it is not always easy to reconstruct an accident:
Sometimes the skid marks and the injuries simply indicate that they occurred
simultaneously, frustrating efforts to determine which driver caused the harm.
In these cases the tendency seems to be that no driver is held responsible, no
treatment is administered, and the involved parties simply get back in their
cars and zoom away.
To bring this back to a non-metaphorical level, I am suggesting that Blackwomen can experience discrimination in ways that are both similar to anddifferent from those experienced by white women and Black men. Black womensometimes experience discrimination in ways similar to white women’s experiences; sometimes they share very similar experiences with Black men. Yetoften they experience double-discrimination—the combined effects of practiceswhich discriminate on the basis of race, and on the basis of sex. And sometimes,
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they experience discrimination as Black women—not the
sum of race and sex
discrimination, but as Black women.
Black women’s experiences are much broader than the gene
ral categories
that discrimination discourse provides. Yet the continued insi
stence that Black
women’s demands and needs be filtered through categori
cal analyses that
completely obscure their experiences guarantees that their n
eeds will seldom
be addressed.
B. The Significance of Doctrinal
Treatment of lntersectionality
DeGraffenreid, Moore and Travenol are doctrinal manifestation
s of a common
political and theoretical approach to discrimination which ope
rates to marginalize
Black women. Unable to grasp the importance of Black w
omen’s intersectional
experiences, not only courts, but feminist and civil rights th
inkers as well have
treated Black women in ways that deny both the unique
compoundedness of
their situation and the centrality of their experiences to
the larger classes of
women and Blacks. Black women are regarded either as
too much like women
or Blacks and the compounded nature of their experienc
e is absorbed into the
collective experiences of either group or as too different,
in which case Black
women’s Blackness or femaleness sometimes has placed
their needs and per
spectives at the margin of the feminist and Black liberat
ionist agendas.
‘While it could be argued that this failure represents an
absence of political
will to include Black women, I believe that it reflects an
uncritical and disturbing
acceptance of dominant ways of thinking about discrim
ination. Consider first
the definition of discrimination that seems to be operati
ve in antidiscrimination
law: Discrimination which is wrongful proceeds from
the identification of a
specific class or category; either a discriminator intentio
nally identifies this
category, or a process is adopted which somehow disad
vantages all members
of this category.29 According to the dominant view, a
discriminator treats all
people within a race or sex category similarly. Any sign
ificant experiential or
statistical variation within this group suggests either that
the group is not being
discriminated against or that conflicting interests exist whi
ch defeat any attempts
to bring a common claim.sa Consequently, one generall
y cannot combine these
categories. Race and sex, moreover, become significant o
nly when they operate
to explicitly disadvantage the victims; because the pri
vilegjng of whiteness or
maleness is implicit, it is generally not perceived at all.
Underlying this conception of discrimination is a view that
the wrong which
antidiscrimination Law addresses is the use of race or gen
der factors to interfere
with decisions that would otherwise be fair or neutra
l. This process-based
definition is not grounded in a bottom-up commitment to im
prove the substantive
conditions for those who are victimized by the interplay
of numerous factors.
Instead, the dominant message of antidiscrimination law
is that it will regulate
only the limited extent to which race or sex interferes w
ith the process of
determining outcomes. This narrow objective is facilitate
d by the top-down
strategy of using a singular “but for” analysis to ascertai
n the effects of race
or sex. Because the scope of antidiscrimination law is so
limited, sex and race
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discrimination have come to be defined in terms of the experiences of thosewho are privileged but far their racial or sexual characteristics. Put differently,the paradigm of sex discrimination tends to be based on the experiences ofwhite women; the model of race discrimination tends to be based on thexperiences of the most privileged Blacks. Notions of what constitutes raceand sex discrimination are, as a result, narrowly tailored to embrace only asmall set of circumstances, none of which include discrimination against Blackwomen.
To the extent that this general description is accurate, the following analogycan be useful in describing how Black women are marginalized in the interfacebetween antidiscrirnination law and race and gender hierarchies: Imagine abasement which contains all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race,sex, class, sexual preference, age and/or physical ability. These people arestacked—feet standing on shoulders—with those on the bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors up to the very top, where the heads ofall those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up against the ceiling. Theirceiling is actually the floor above which only those who are not disadvantagedin any way reside. In efforts to correct some aspects of domination, those abovethe ceiling admit from the basement only those who can say that “but for’the ceiling, they too would be in the upper room. A hatch is developed throughwhich those placed Immediately below can crawl. Yet this hatch is generallyavailable only to those who—due to the singularity of their burden and theirotherwise privileged position relative to those below—are In the position tocrawl through. Those who are multiply-burdened are generally left below unlessthey can somehow pull themselves into the groups that are permitted to squeezethrough the hatch.
As this analogy translates for Black women, the problem is that they canreceive protection only to the extent that their experiences are recognizablysimilar to those whose experiences tend to be reflected in antidiscriminationdoctrine. If Black women cannot conclusively say that “but for” their race or“but for” their gender they would be treated differently, they are not invitedto climb through the hatch but told to wait in the unprotected margin untilthey can be absorbed into the broader, protected categories of race and sex.Despite the narrow scope of this dominant conception of discriminationand its tendency to marginali.ze those whose experiences cannot be describedwithin its tightly-drawn parameters, this approach has been regarded as theappropriate framework for addressing a range of problems. In much of feministtheory and, to some extent, in antiracist politics, this framework is reflectedin the belief that sexism or racism can be meaningfully discussed withoutpaying attention to the lives of those other than the race-, gender- or class-privileged. As a result, both feminist theory and antiracist politics have beenorganized, in part, around the equation of racism with what happens to theBlack middle-class or to Black men, and the equation of sexism with whathappens to white women.
Looking at historical and contemporary issues in both the feminist and thecivil rights communities, one can find ample evidence of how both communities’
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acceptance of the dominant framework of discrimination has hindered the
development of an adequate theory and praxis to address problems of inter
sectionaliry. This adoption of a single-issue framework for discrimination not
only rnarginalizes Black women within the very movements that claim them
as part of their constituency but it also makes the Illusive goal of ending racism
and patriarchy even more difficult to attain.
II. Feminism and Black Women: “Ain’t We Women?”
Oddly, despite the relative inability of feminist politics and theory to address
Black women substantively, feminist theory and tradition borrow considerably
from Black women’s history. For example, “Ain’t I a Woman” has come to
represent a standard refrain in feminist discourse.3 Yet the lesson of this
powerful oratory is not fully appreciated because the context of the delivery
is seldom examined, I would like to tell part of the story because it establishes
some themes that have characterized feminist treatment of race and illustrates
the importance of including Black women’s experiences as a rich source for
the critique of patriarchy.
In 1851, Sojourner Truth declared “Ain’t I a Woman?” and challenged the
sexist imagery used by male critics to justify the disenfranchisement of women.32
The scene was a Women’s Rights Conference in Akron, Ohio; white male
hecklers, invoking stereotypical Images of “womanhood,” argued that women
were too frail and delicate to take on the responsibilities of political activity.
When Sojourner Truth rose to speak, many white women urged that she be
silenced, fearing that she would divert attention from women’s suffrage to
emancipation. Truth, once permitted to speak, recounted the horrors of slavery,
and its particular impact on Black women:
Look at my arms! I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns, and no
man could head me—and ain’t I a woman? I would work as much and eat as
much as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a
woman? I have born thirteen children, and seen most of ‘em sold into slavery,
and when I cried Out with my mother’s grief: none but Jesus heard me—and
ain’t I a woman?33
By using her own life to reveal the contradiction between the ideological
myths of womanhood and the reality of Black women’s experience, Truth’s
oratory provided a powerful rebuttal to the claim that women were categorically
weaker than men. Yet Truth’s personal challenge to the coherence of the cult
of true womanhood was useful only to the extent that white women were
willing to reject the racist attempts to rationalize the contradiction—that because
Black women were something less than real women, their experiences had no
bearing on true womanhood. Thus, this 19th-century Black feminIst challenged
not only patriarchy, but she also challenged white feminists wishing to embrace
Black women’s history to relinquish their vestedness in whiteness.
Contemporary white feminists inherit not the legacy of Truth’s challenge to
patriarchy but, instead, Truth’s challenge to their forbearers. Even today, the
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difficulty that white women have traditionally experienced in sacrificing racial
privilege to strengthen feminism renders them susceptible to Truth’s critical
question. When feminist theory and politics that claim to reflect women’s
experience and women’s aspirations do not include or speak to Black women,
Black women must ask: “Ain’t We Women?” If this is so, how can the claims
that “women are,” “women believe” and “women need” be made when such
claims are inapplicable or unresponsive to the needs, interests and experiences
0f Black women?
The value of feminist theory to Black women is diminished because it evolves
from a white racial context that Is seldom acknowledged. Not only are women
of color In fact overlooked, but their exclusion is reinforced when white women
speak for and as women. The authoritative universal voice—usually white male
subjectivity masquerading as non-racial, non-gendered objectivity3i mereLy
transferred to those who, but for gender, share many of the same cultural,
economic and social characteristics. ‘When feminist theory attempts to describe
women’s experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality, or separate spheres
ideology, it often overlooks the role of race. Feminists thus Ignore how their
own race functions to mitigate some aspects of sexism and, moreover, how it
often privileges them over and contributes to the domination of other women.
Consequently, feminist theory remains white, and its potential to broaden and
deepen its analysis by addressing non’privileged women remains unrealized,
An example of how some feminist theories are narrowly constructed around
white women’s experiences is found in the separate spheres literature. The
critique of how separate spheres ideology shapes and limits women’s roles in
the home and in public life is a central theme in feminist legal thought.
Feminists have attempted to expose and dismantle separate spheres ideology
by identifying and criticizing the stereotypes that traditionally have justified
the disparate societal roles assigned to men and women. Yet this attempt to
debunk ideological justifications for women’s subordination offers little insight
into the domination of Black women. Because the experiential base upon which
many feminist insights are grounded is white, theoretical statements drawn
from them are overgeneralized at best, and often wrong) Statements such as
“men and women are taught to see men as independent, capable, powerful;
men and women are taught to see women as dependent, limited in abilities,
and passive,”39are common within this literature. But this “observation” overlooks
the anomalies created by crosscurrents of racism and sexism. Black men and
women live in a society that creates sex-based norms and expectations which
racism operates simultaneously to deny; Black men are not viewed as powerful,
nor are Black women seen as passive. An effort to develop an ideological
explanation of gender domination in the Black community should proceed from
an understanding of how crosscutting forces establish gender norms and how
the conditions of Black subordination wholly frustrate access to these norms.
Given this understanding, perhaps we can begin to see why Black women have
been dogged by the stereotype of the pathological matriarch40 or why there
have been those in the Black liberation movement who aspire to create institutions
and to build traditions that are intentionally patriarchal.4
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Because ideological and descriptive definitions of patriarchy are usually
premised upon white female experiences, feminists and others informed by
feminist literature may make the mistake of assuming that since the role of
Black women in the family and in other Black institutions does not always
resemble the familiar mariifc5tations of patriarchy in the white community,
Black women are somehow exempt from patriarchal norms. For example, Black
women have traditionally worked outside the home in numbers far exceeding
the labor participation rate of white women.1 An analysis of patriarchy that
highlights the history of white women’s exclusion from the workplace might
permit the inference that Black women have not been burdened by this particular
gender-based expectation. Yet the very fact that Black women must work conflicts
with norms that women should not, often creating personal, emotional and
relationship problems in Black women’s lives. Thus, Black women are burdened
not only because they often have to take on responsibilities that are not
traditionally feminine but, moreover, their assumption of these roles is sometimes
interpreted within the Black community as either Black women’s failure to live
up to such norms or as another manifestation of racism’s scourge upon the
Black community.43 This is one of the many aspects of intersectionality that
cannot be understood through an analysis of patriarchy rooted in white
experience.
Another example of how theory emanating from a white context obscures
the multidimensioriality of Black women’s lives is found in feminist discourse
on rape. A central political issue on the feminist agenda has been the pervasive
problem of rape. Part of the intellectual and political effort to mobilize around
this issue has involved the development of a historical critique of the role that
law has played in establishing the bounds of normative sexuality and in regulating
female sexual behavior.44 Early carnal knowledge statutes and rape laws are
understood within this discourse to illustrate that the objective of rape statutes
traditionally has not been to protect women from coercive intimacy but to
protect and maintain a property-like interest in female chastity.45 Although
feminists quite rightly criticize these objectives, to characterize rape law as
reflecting male control over female sexuality is ftr Black women an oversimpliled
account and an ultimately inadequate account.
Rape statutes generally do not reflect mali control over female sexuality,
but white male regulation of white female sexuality.4 Historically, there has
been absolutely no institutional effort to regulate Black female chastity.47 Courts
in some states had gone so far as to instruct juries that, unlike white women,
Black women were not presumed .to be chaste.48 Also, while It was true that
the attempt to regulate the sexuality of white women placed unchaste women
outside the law’s protection, racism restored a fallen white woman’s chastity
where the alleged assailant was a Black man.49 No such restoration was available
to Black women.
The singular focus on rape as a manifestation of male power over female
sexuality tends to eclipse the use of rape as a weapon of racial terror.5°When
Black women were raped by white males, they were being raped not as women
generally, but as Black women specifically: Their femaleness made them sexually
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vulnerable to racist domination, while their Blackness effectively denied them
any protection.5’This white male power was reinforced by a judicial system
in which the successful conviction of a white man for raping a Black woman
was virtually unthinkable.
In sum, sexist expectations of chastity and racist assumptions of sexual
promiscuity combined to create a distinct set of issues confronting Black
women.53 These issues have seldom been explored in feminist literature nor
are they prominent in antiracist politics. The lynching of Black males, the
institutional practice that was legitimized by the regulation of white women’s
sexuality, has historically and contemporaneously occupied the Black agenda
on sexuality and violence. Consequently, Black women are caught between a
Black community that, perhaps understandably, views with suspicion attempts
to litigate questions of sexual violence, and a feminist community that reinforces
those suspicions by focusing on white female sexuality.54 The suspicion iscompounded by the historical fact that the protection of white female sexuality
was often the pretext for terrorizing the Black community. Even today some
fear that antirape agendas may undermine antiracist objectives. This is theparadigmatic political and theoretical dilemma created by the intersection of
race and gender: Black women are caught between ideological and political
currents that combine first to create and then to bury Black women’s experiences.
HI. When and Where I Enter: Integrating an
Analysis of Sexism into Black Liberation Politics
Anna Julia Cooper, a 19th-century Black feminist, coined a phrase that hasbeen useful in evaluating the need to incorporate an explicit analysis of patriarchyin any effort to address racial domination.55Cooper often criticized Black leadersand spokespersons for claiming to speak for the race, but failing to speak forBlack women. Referring to one of Martin Delaney’s public claims that wherehe was allowed to enter, the race entered with him, Cooper countered: “Onlythe Black Woman can say, when and where I enter . . . then and there thewhole Negro race enters with me.”56
Cooper’s words bring to mind a personal experience involving two Blackmen with whom I had formed a study group during our first year of lawschool. One of our group members, a graduate from Harvard College, oftentold us stories about a prestigious and exclusive men’s club that boastedmemberships of several past United States presidents and other influential whitemales. He was one of its very few Black members. To celebrate completing ourfirst-year exams, our friend invited us to join him at the club for drinks.Anxious to see this fabled place, we approached the large door and graspedthe brass door ring to announce our arrival. But our grand entrance was cutshort when our friend sheepishly slipped from behind the door and whisperedthat he had forgotten a very important detail. My companion and I bristled,our training as Black people having taught us to expect yet another barrier toour inclusion; even an informal one-Black-person quota at the establishmentwas not unimaginable. The tension broke, however, when we learned that we
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would not be excluded because of our race, but that I wo
uld have to go around
to the back door because I was a female. I entertain
ed the idea of making a
scene to dramatize the fact that my humiliation as a fem
ale was no less painful
and my exclusion no more excusable than had we all
been sent to the back
door because we were Black. But, sensing no general asse
nt to this proposition,
and also being of the mind that due to our race a sce
ne would In some way
jeopardize all of us, I failed to stand my ground. Aft
er all, the Club was about
to entertain its first Black guests—even though one wo
uld have to enter through
the back door,51
Perhaps this story is not the best example of the Black
community’s failure
to address problems related to Black women’s Inters
ectionality seriously. The
story would be more apt if Black women, and only
Black women, had to go
around to the back door of the club and if the re
striction came from within,
and not from the outside of the Black community.
Still this story does reflect
a markedly decreased political and emotional vigilan
ce toward barriers to Black
women’s enjoyment of privileges that have been w
on on the basis of race but
continue to be denied on the basis of sex.
The story also illustrates the ambivalence among B
lack women about the
degree of political and social capit4l that ought to be
expended toward challenging
gender barriers, particularly when the challenge
s might conflict with the
antiracism agenda. While there are a number of reas
ons—including antifeminist
ones—why gender has not figured directly in ana
lyses of the subordination of
Black Americans, a central reason is that race Is
still seen by many as the
primary oppositional force in Black lives. If one accept
s that the social experience
of race creates both a primary group identity as w
ell as a shared sense of being
under collective assault, some of the reasons that
Black feminist theory and
politics have not figured prominently in the Blac
k political agenda may be
better understood.6
The point is not that African Americans are s
imply involved in a more
important struggle. Although some efforts to opp
ose Black feminism are based
on this assumption, a fuller appreciation of the prob
lems of the Black community
will reveal that gender subordination does contribute
significantly to the destitute
conditions of so many African Americans and that it
must therefore be addressed.
Moreover, the foregoing critique of the single-issue
framework renders prob
lematic the claim that the struggle against racism
is distinguishable from, much
less prioritized over, the struggle against sexism.
Yet It is also true that the
politics of racial otherness that Black women exper
ience along with Black men
prevent Black feminist consciousness from patternin
g the development of white
feminism. For white women, the creation of a co
nseiousness that was distinct
from and In opposition to that of white men f
igured prominently in the
development of white feminist politics. Black wom
en, like Black men, live in
a community that has been defined and subordin
ated by color and culrure.6
Although patriarchy clearly operates within the B
lack community, presenting
yet another source of domination to which Black w
omen are vulnerable, the
racial context in which Black women find themsel
ves makes the creation of a
political consciousness that Is oppositional to Black
men difficult.
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Yet while it Is true that the distinct experience of racial otherness militates
against the development of an oppositional feminist consciousness, the assertion
0f racial community sometimes supports defensive priorities that marginalize
Black women. Black women’s particular interests are thus relegated to the
periphery in public policy discussions about the presumed needs of the Black
community. The controversy over the movie The Color Purple is illustrative
The animating fear behind much of the publicized protest was that by portraying
domestic abuse in a Black family, the movie confirmed the negative stereotypes
of Black men.2 The debate over the propriety of presenting such an image
on the screen overshadowed the issue of sexism and patriarchy in the Black
community. Even though it was sometimes acknowledged that the Black
community was not immune from domestic violence and other manifestations
of gender subordination, some nevertheless felt that in the absence of positive
Black male images in the media, portraying such images merely reinforced racial
stereotypes.63 The struggle against racism seemed to compel the subordination
of certain aspects of the Black female experience in order to ensure the security
of the larger Black community.
The nature of this debate should sound familiar to anyone who recalls
Daniel Moynihan’s diagnosis of the ills of Black America. Moynihan’s report
depicted a deteriorating Black family, foretold the destruction of the Black male
householder and lamented the creation of the Black matriarch. His conclusions
prompted a massive critique from liberal sociologists65 and from civil rights
leaders. Surprisingly, while many critics characterized the report as racist for
its blind use of whIte cuLtural norms as the standard for evaluating Black
families, few pointed out the sexism apparent in Moynihan’s labeling Black
women as pathological for their “failure” to live up to a white female standard
of motherhood.67
The latest versions of a Moynihanesque analysis can be found in the Moyers
televised special, The Vanishing Black Family,65 and, to a lesser extent, in
William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged.69 In The VanLshing Black
Family, Moyers presented the problem of female-headed households as a problem
of irresponsible sexuality, induced in part by government policies that encouraged
family breakdown.7°The theme of the report was that the welfare state reinforced
the deterioration of the Black family by rendering the Black male’s role obsolete.
As the argument goes, because Black men know that someone will take care
of their families, they are free to make babies and leave them. A corollary to
the Moyers view is that welfare is also dysfunctional because it allows poor
women to leave men upon whom they would otherwise be dependent.
Most commentators criticizing the program failed to pose challenges that
might have revealed the patriarchal assumptions underlying much of the Moyers
report. They instead focused on the dimension of the problem that was clearly
recognizable as racist.7’White feminists were equally culpable. There was little,
if any, published response to the Moyers report from the white feminist
community. Perhaps feminists were under the mistaken assumption that since
the report focused on the Black community, the problems highlighted were
racial, not gender based. Whatever the reason, the result was that the ensuing
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debates over the future direction of welfare and family policy proceeded without
significant feminist input. The absence of a strong feminist critique of the
Moynihan/lvloyers model not only impeded the interests of Black women, but
it also compromised the interests of growing numbers of white women heads
of household who find It difficult to make ends meet.7Z
William Julius Wilson’s The Truly Disadvantaged modified much of the
moralistic tone of this debate by reframing the issue in terms of a lack of
marriageable Black men.13 According to Wilson, the decline in Black marriages
is not attributable to poor motivation, bad work habits or irresponsibility but
instead Is caused by structural economics which have forced Black unskilled
labor out of the work force. Wilson’s approach represents a significant move
away from that of MoynihanfMoyers in that he rejects their attempt to center
the analysis on the morals of the Black community. Yet, he too considers the
proliferation of female-headed households as dysfunctional per se and fails to
explain fully why such households are so much in peril. Because he incorporates
no analysis of the way the structure of the economy and the workforce
subordinates the interests of women, especially childbearing Black women,
Wilson’s suggested reform begins with finding ways to put Black men back in
the family.74 In Wilson’s view, we must change the economic structure with
an eye toward providing more Black jobs for Black men. Because he offers no
critique of sexism, Wilson fails to consider economic or social reorganization
that directLy empowers and supports these single Black mothers.75
My criticism is not that providing Black men with jobs is undesirable; Indeed,
this is necessary not only for the Black men themselves, but for an entire
community, depressed and subject to a host of sociological and economic Ills
that accompany massive rates of unemployment. But as long as we assume that
the massive social reorganization Wilson calls for is possible, why not think
about it in ways that maximize the choices of Black women?16A more complete
theoretical and political agenda for the Black underclass must take into account
the specific and particular concerns of Black women their families occupy the
bottom rung of the economic ladder, and it is only through placing them at
the center of the analysis that their needs and the needs of their families will
be directly addressed.77
IV. Expanding Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics by Embracing the Intersection
If any real efforts are to. be made to free Black people of the constraints
and conditions that characterize racial subordination, then theories and strategies
purporting to reflect the Black community’s needs must include an analysis of
sexism and patriarchy. Similarly, feminism must include an analysis of race if
it hopes to express the aspirations of non-white women. Neither Black liberationist
politics nor feminist theory can ignore the intersectional experiences of those
whom the movements claim as their respective constituents. In order to include
Black women, both movements must distance themselves from earlier approaches
in which experiences are relevant only when they are related to certain clearly
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identifiable causes (for example, the oppression of Blacks is significant when
based on race, of women when based on gender>. The praxis of both should
be centered on the life chances and life situations of people who should be
cared about without regard to the source of their difficulties.
I have stated earlier that the failure to embrace the complexities of com
poundedness Is not simply a matter of political will, but is also due to the
influence of a way of thinking about discrimination which structures politcs
so that struggles are categorized as singular issues. Moreover, this structure
Imports a descriptive and normative view of society that reinforces the status
quo.
It Is somewhat Ironic that those concerned with alleviating the ills of racism
and sexism should adopt such a top-down approach to discrimination, if their
efforts Instead began with addressing the needs and problems of those who
are most disadvantaged and with restructuring and remaking the world where
necessary then others who are singularly disadvantaged would also benefit. In
addition, it seems that placing those who currently are marginalized in the
center is the most effective way to resist efforts to compartmentalize experiences
and undermine potential collective action.
It is not necessary to believe that a political consensus to focus on the lives
of the most disadvantaged will happen tomorrow in order to recenter discrirn
ination discourse at the intersection. It Is enough, for now, that such an effort
would encourage us to look beneath the prevailing conceptions of discrimination
and to challenge the complacency that accompanies belief in the effectiveness
of this framework. By so doing, we may develop language which is critical of
the dominant view and which provides some basis for unifying activity. The
goal of this activity should be to facilitate the inclusion of marginalized groups
for whom It can be said: “When they enter, we all enter.”
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